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Path Dependency and Change in International 
Relations: Institutional Dynamics in the Field of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Johannes Marx  
Abstract: »Pfadabhängigkeit und Wandel in den Internationalen Beziehungen. 
Bestimmungsfaktoren institutionellen Wandels im Politikfeld geistige Eigen-
tumsrechte«. In the last decade the historic dimension of politics has become 
more and more important in political science. There are a growing number of 
articles dealing with questions of political dynamics and political processes. 
Nevertheless, the interdisciplinary dialogue is rare between history and politi-
cal science. This article examines first the characteristics of both disciplines 
and asks for a common methodological ground analyzing political processes. It 
is argued that the analysis of political processes should be theory-driven, look-
ing for social mechanisms like path dependency and based on agency. The use-
fulness of this method will be demonstrated by analyzing the international 
regulation of Intellectual Property Rights. It will be reasoned that external 
changes in the environment of the international institutions (WIPO and GATT) 
triggered changes in the development of the path along which the protection of 
IPRs evolved and switched the modus of institutional change from path de-
pendency to open change and vice versa. 
Keywords: institutional dynamics, intellectual property rights, WIPO, TRIPs, 
path dependency. 
1. Introduction 
Patents and other intellectual property rights are an important factor for the 
wealth of nations (Maskus 2000). A patent provides the right to exclude others 
from profiting from a patented invention for a certain period of time. Thus, if 
there were no patents, we may assume that only few persons would invest in 
research and development. Due to the expected economic benefits secured by 
Intellectual Property Rights [IPRs] there is a strong incentive to guarantee IPRs 
in International Relations.1 
                                                             
  Address all communications to: Johannes Marx, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Abt. 
Systemanalyse und Systemvergleich, Universität Mainz; Colonel-Kleinmann-Weg 2; 55128 
Mainz, Germany; e-mail: jmarx@uni-mainz.de. 
URL: http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/cms/941_DEU_HTML.php. 
1  There is an intense debate about the necessary level of protection producing economic 
wealth (Landes and Posner 2003; Maskus 2000; Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998; Richards 
2005). 
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The development of policies pertaining to the establishment of the interna-
tional protection of IPRs is a conflict-laden process in International Relations. 
Several actors operate in this field with sometimes diametrically opposed inter-
ests. The industrialized countries, for instance, argue for a higher protection 
level, while the developing countries want to lower it.2 
At the moment, there are two international institutions monitoring the inter-
national treaties concerning IPRs: the World Intellectual Property Organization 
[WIPO] and the World Trade Organization [WTO] with the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPs], negotiated by 
the Uruguay-Round from 1986 to 1994 (May and Sell 2006; May 2006; Freder-
ick 2000). 
The process of establishing IPRs can be divided into three phases: From the 
1880s to the 1960s, the international regulation of IPRs was stable and efficient 
most of the time. The established institution, the Bureau Internationaux réunis 
pour la protection de la propriété intellectuelle (BIRPI), was able to handle the 
occurring problems regarding IPRs. This phase ended when the protection of 
IPRs was improved by the creation of WIPO. The second phase, which lasted 
from the 1960s until the meeting of the Uruguay-Round, was characterized by 
a deadlock in the WIPO and a new dynamic outside of this institution. The 
present phase is again characterized by institutional stagnation in the 
TRIPs/WTO and hot debates about the legitimacy of the institutional design in 
the field of IPRs and bi- and multilateral negotiations outside the existing insti-
tutions. 
In the following, I will concentrate on the process of IPR development from 
the starting point in the 1880ies passing the rising dissatisfaction with the pro-
tection level of IPRs in the 1950ies up to the recent situation. The main re-
search focus is on the driving forces of this process. Against the background of 
this process the following problems will be discussed: 
1) Why did the process of establishing IPRs come to an abrupt halt at the very 
moment when the BIRPI was “upgraded” and became the World Intellectual 
Property Organization?  
2) Obviously, WIPO did not suffice for the protection of IPRs, hence, as a 
second regime, TRIPs was established within the WTO. Why did the WIPO 
not live up to expectations? 
                                                             
2  It should be made clear at that point that the author neither argues for an optimal protection 
level of IPRs nor complains about an insufficient protection level due to strong resistance of 
developing countries. The aim of the article is just to ask for the causes that bring out that 
special and unique developing path. Using terms like ‘improve’, ‘did not suffice’, ‘did not 
live up expectations’, or ‘new quality’ are no normative statements of the author but reflect 
the perspective of the most powerful actors in the field at that time. 
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3) TRIPs was one of the main claims of the western negotiators during the 
Uruguay-Round. Why did TRIPs not work as an instrument to enhance the 
protection level of IPRs in the way the western states expected? 
These kinds of questions ask for process-analyses. With process-analyses it 
is possible to identify mechanisms that are relevant for change and stability in 
International Relations. It will be discussed if the concept of path dependence, 
as a central mechanism, can be used for the analysis of the international devel-
opment of IPRs. It is argued that parts of the process can be understood in 
terms of path dependency while others are the result of a changing global con-
text instead of the institutional setting. The basic assumption of this article is 
that the whole process is a consequence of the rational action of the relevant 
actors, regardless of whether the results of the actions were intended or non-
intended. 
In part two, theoretical reflections such as how to analyze dynamic and his-
torical processes will be presented. On the basis of the debate between histori-
ans and social scientists in the 1990s a methodological framework (rational 
choice narrativism and the idea of social mechanisms) will be developed to 
analyze historical processes (Kiser and Hechter 1991, 1998; Elman and Elman 
1997). For the analysis of institutional change this methodological framework 
will be enriched in part three by the concept of path dependency as a central 
social mechanism governing temporal processes. The historical analysis of the 
developing path of the international institutions of IPRs will ensue in part four. 
It will be argued that, as already mentioned above, the process of establishing 
IPRs can be partially explained in terms of path dependency while other parts 
cannot. Thus, it is one central concern of this article to show how external 
changes in the environment of the international institutions (WIPO and GATT) 
triggered changes in the development of the path along which the protection of 
IPRs evolved and switched the modus of institutional change from path de-
pendency to dynamics and vice versa. 
2. Analyzing Temporal Processes in Social Science 
The study of the development of international institutions is of interest to both 
political scientists and historians. The scholars working in these two fields 
usually have very different ideas on how to proceed. While historians, as a rule, 
favor an ideographic and narrative-oriented approach analyzing their subjects, 
political scientists seek to develop nomothetic and deductive models of expla-
nation. This debate between historians and social scientists is well known as a 
historical fact. But the relevance of this debate for the analysis of historical 
processes is quite unknown. Central aspects of this debate have an enormous 
impact on how to proceed in the process analysis. Firstly, referring to the de-
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bate between historians and social scientists the methodological problems of 
process analysis will be identified.3 Secondly, it will be argued that rational 
choice narrativism is a method to deal with the special challenges of process 
analysis. 
2.1. Nomothetic Versus Ideographic 
This methodological distinction between the two disciplines goes back to a 
19th century German debate. Windelband introduced the terms “nomothetic” 
and “ideographic” in a speech he gave in 1894 to capture the methodological 
difference between explanatory and hermeneutic sciences (Windelband 1904). 
While ideographic sciences aim at understanding individual occurrences with 
respect to their complexities by employing hermeneutic methods, nomothetic 
sciences aim at explaining them as instances of natural laws at work. The ques-
tion which has been discussed up to the present day is: what is the correct 
method for social sciences in general and the study of history in particular: 
understanding or explaining, verstehen or erklären (Haussmann 1991; Wright 
1980). 
Windelband himself thought that ideographic sciences also require general 
propositions if they want to causally explain historical processes. Hempel can 
be interpreted similarly since he points out that there is a causal understanding 
of explanation inherent in historical reasoning (Hempel 1942). In this sense, the 
basic, though quite oversubscribed, comparison in the scientific literature must 
be understood rather gradually. As the debate reveals, however, there is no 
such categorical difference between the study of history, on the one hand, and 
political science on the other. As Windelband himself and later Hempel pointed 
out, any rendition of historical occurrences requires assumptions of causality. 
The differentiation is not useful to distinguish political from historical sciences. 
Especially the rejection of the possible explanations of history does not meet 
the requirements of the actual work of historians. Indeed, historians search for 
causes of historical developments as well, in doing so they also draw on theo-
retical assumptions (Van den Braembussche 1989). 
Vice versa, social scientists have to take historical circumstances into ac-
count if they wish to claim that their theories are empirically true:”Historians 
and political scientists have argued that just as all international relations theo-
ries need historical facts against which they can be measured, so too do all 
historical works offer assertions about the possible causes of the events they 
describe, and hence are relying on (sometimes implicit) causal theories” (El-
man and Elman 1997: 7). Therefore, the difference between historical and 
social sciences is less a matter of whether theories and analytical methods are 
                                                             
3  For a more detailed argumentation see Marx 2007, 2008. 
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used or not, but rather of the role they play in the scientific process (Levy 1997: 
25). 
2.2 Narrative Understanding versus DN Model of Explanation 
Another differentiation is made between narrative understanding and the DN 
(Deductive Nomological) model of explanation. In accordance with Elman and 
Elman, this dichotomy represents the defining difference between the disci-
plines: “According to one popular view, historians (unlike political scientists) 
pursue narrative-based rather than theory-based explanations” (Elman and 
Elman 1997: 7). Kiser and Hechter also work with this very criterion to differ-
entiate between historical and social sciences (Kiser and Hechter 1991, 1998). 
After Kiser and Hechter, historians use narrative elements at two points in the 
scientific process: first to describe the initial conditions of the analyzed process 
to prepare the ground for the analytical reasoning. Second, they use narrative 
elements to embed their arguments in a historical context and to enrich their 
structural arguments with empirical data (Kiser 1996: 252). 
Due to the importance of the term ‘narration’ for these methodological ques-
tions it is necessary to clarify its meaning. Central components of a narration 
are a certain number of events as well as their chronological order. Accord-
ingly, narrations can be defined as sentences about a sequence of events which 
stand in a meaningful context to each other. Narrations systematically refer 
back to the social actions of persons. This way, they distance themselves from 
works explaining the change of social phenomena by social structure analysis 
at the macrolevel: 
First, narrativists want to bring actors back into historical analysis. They argue 
that structuralist historical accounts are often incomplete because they lack 
sufficiently detailed accounts of how macrolevel causes produce macrolevel 
effects and that the intervening mechanisms necessary to complete structural 
arguments are found at the microlevel (Kiser 1996: 250). 
The aim of historical narration, thus, is the exposure of mechanisms that 
bring about social and cultural changes. Hence, a narration can be regarded as a 
linguistic account of how social processes change. The beginning of a narration 
consists of a description of a social starting point and it ends with the descrip-
tion of a modified social situation analogous to the explanandum of the DN 
model of explanation. The change is ascribed to the protagonists of the narra-
tion (Roberts 2006). Consequently, the narration embodies a meaningful expla-
nation of the given social process by telling the social mechanisms as the driv-
ing forces of the process (Danto 1968). 
Furthermore, many political scientists advocate the nomological model of 
explanation which is usually based on the methodological program of critical 
rationalism (Popper 1981). In this respect, a scientific explanation is repre-
sented by a number of premises from which the explanandum can be logically 
deduced. Among these premises has to be at least one general law. This con-
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cept of scientific explanations is exemplified in the Hempel-Oppenheim-
scheme (Hempel 1965; Hempel 1942). 
In social sciences such an explanatory understanding is usually accompanied 
by the employment of quantitative methods. In this context, academic papers 
often explain social phenomena by referring to features of the social structure. 
Such a program strives for an explanation by alluding to persistent, supra-
individual and structural circumstances as social norms or the distribution of 
social trust. Structural theories of this kind are widespread in various fields of 
political science. Even the major theories of International Relations ultimately 
are structural theories ascribing stability or instability of International Relations 
to structural circumstances such as the constellations of power. The aim of such 
a scientific understanding is the discovery of general and informative proposi-
tions about social phenomena which must then be subjected to rigorous empiri-
cal tests. If they fail the test, they are to be abandoned; if they succeed they are 
“on probate” (Lakatos 1964; Popper 1979). 
Both explanatory strategies face immense problems of justification. Against 
a narrative explanatory strategy it may be objected that the actual causal 
mechanisms are mentioned only implicitly. The theoretical assumptions are not 
named explicitly and can, thus, not be subjected to criticism: “Narrative analy-
sis cannot escape from theoretical assumptions, although clearly historians vary 
in the extent to which they self-consciously follow a well-specified theory in 
their narratives” (Levy 1997: 27). Mentioning these implicit assumptions ex-
plicitly and, hence, pointing out the premises of one´s own argumentation 
would, so one may assume, contribute to scientific progress. 
Vice versa, the deductive-nomological explanatory understanding is criti-
cized because of its orientation towards macroscopic laws of structure, block-
ing the view of the actual mechanisms responsible for the formation and altera-
tion of social phenomena (Hedström and Swedberg 1996; Schmid 2006; 
Stinchcombe 1991). If one is interested in the explanation of changes of social 
processes, the responsible mechanisms should be named explicitly. Representa-
tives of a narrative explanatory understanding share this criticism of macroana-
lysis which is still regarded valid in large parts of the social sciences. Stressing 
the meaning of temporality, systematically disregarded in observations of struc-
ture, they call for a theoretical orientation towards the acting man. 
2.3 Rational Choice Narrativism for the Analysis of Historical 
Processes 
The orientation towards the idea of human agency is common to both branches 
of research. Therefore, the differences stressed in the literature seem to be 
exaggerated.  
Narrative can be defined as a method – a form of data presentation that is op-
timal when the data are neither too complex nor too fragmentary for data re-
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duction techniques (such as tabular presentation or quantitative analysis) to be 
used and when temporal sequence and particular details are important aspects 
of the data or the argument being made (Kiser 1996: 260). 
Hence, the question of the appropriate explanatory strategy depends on the 
quality of the information of the available data (Abell 2004). A narrative ex-
planatory strategy is preferable if complex or fragmentary boundary conditions 
are limiting the approach of quantitative analysis methods. In consequence, 
analyzing the historical development of international institutions is best imple-
mented in narrative oriented studies. 
Narrative methods are to use if one or more of the following arguments are 
observed: 
Quantitative research strategies can be limited due to the fragmentary and 
incomplete character of the available data. 
Another problem restricting the scope and performance of quantitative 
methods for historical processes is the varying constraints in historical proc-
esses. These processes are characterized by the existence of exogenous vari-
ables that supervene in the setting of historical processes and change its charac-
teristics.  
Theories based on the variables of the initial point of the process cannot ex-
plain the change of an international institution without taking into account the 
relevant variables of the changing environment. Sometimes even new variables 
have to be considered. These variables are not inherent in these historical proc-
esses but they result from other social circumstances (Stegmüller 1983). 
It is the theoretical challenge to deal with such ‘historical’ variables: 
 
 
S1-n = Situations 
S1‘-n‘ = Situations to expect theoretically which didn’t occur 
C1-n = Limiting conditions 
 
One way to handle this issue is to use a narrative approach open for empiri-
cal change. The narrative links the initial point of the process with the explan-
andum that is to be explained by referring to the behavior of rational actors in a 
changing context. The danger of this method is to slide into story-telling 
(Schimmelfennig 2006). Therefore, the analysis must be guided by a theoretical 
framework and linked to historical data. 
In this study for instance the analysis has to handle the problem of new 
member states entering the forums of the international organizations. We find 
sequencing in this process and we find actors that stick to institutional rules 
even if they do not meet their expectations. 
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The proposed method for the analysis of such historical processes is rational 
choice narrativism. Rational choice narrativism stresses the idea that social 
change can be explained by the assumption of rationality to institutional and 
individual behavior. At the same time rational choice narrativism is open to 
historical change. With the narrative elements of an explanation one can de-
scribe the changes of social context variables that are not linked to the rational 
behavior of the observed unit of social life. There are three basic assumptions 
of rational choice narrativism: (1) individual interests are relevant for explain-
ing actions, (2) social and material restrictions are relevant factors, (3) and 
actors behave on the basis of a utility function that means they maximize their 
individual benefit. 
Using this approach, the analysis of historical processes is linked to the be-
havior of rational actors (Bates et al. 1998, Kiser and Hechter 1998). However, 
this decision only commits us to the idea of methodological individualism and 
rationalism. Still, there is a need for more theoretical insight in the characteris-
tics of historical processes. 
3. Rational Choice Narrativism, Path Dependency and 
a Theory of Change 
The methodological toolbox for the analysis of temporal processes offers more 
than the idea that history matters. The analysis of historical processes is in-
spired by the desire to discover social mechanisms. “Most important, examin-
ing temporal processes allows us to identify and explicate some fundamental 
social mechanisms” (Pierson 2004: 7). Social Mechanisms are defined as 
“plausible, frequently observed ways in which things happen” (Elster 1989: 
viii). The concept of social mechanisms as used by Elster (1989), Hedström 
and Swedberg (1996), and Schmid (2006) is linked to the idea of rational 
choice theory. Social mechanisms are understood as a frequently observed link 
between social situations, the rational actions of a group of people and the 
phenomena that is to be explained. This link is based on the idea of methodo-
logical individualism, i.e.by taking recourse to the concept of rationality.  
There are several social mechanisms in the Social Sciences. One widespread 
known mechanism is path dependency (North 2006; Pierson 2004; Mahoney 
2000).4  
A process is path dependent if initial moves in one direction elicit further mo-
ves in that same direction; in other words the order in which things happen af-
fects how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains 
the trajectory after that point (Kay 2005: 553).  
                                                             
4  In the following, the article will concentrate on the relevance of this mechanism for the 
explanation of international regulation of IPRs. 
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This vague definition of path dependency can be clarified by differentiating 
between various concepts of path dependency. 
In literature, one can find three major strands dealing with different concepts 
of path dependence: increasing returns path dependence, evolutionary path 
dependence, and sequencing path dependence.5  
- The most prominent concept of path dependence is increasing returns path 
dependence. This variant is typical for economic arguments. Increasing re-
turns path dependence arises if “the productive input yields more than a 
proportionate increase in output” (Hathaway 2001: 107). Douglass North 
employed this concept to explain institutional change and the development 
of economies (North 2006). Increasing returns path dependence has three 
main characteristics: First, the outcome of temporal processes is open and 
unpredictable ex ante, because multiple equilibria are possible (Arthur 1994: 
112). Second, “the further into the process we are, the harder it becomes to 
shift from one path to another” (Pierson 2004: 18). Increasing returns path 
dependence leads to inflexibility (lock-in effect). Third, increasing returns 
processes are characterized by “nonergodicity”. „Ergodic [...] processes are 
those wherein outcomes are not remarkably affected by the sequence of 
events. In contrast, nonergodic […] processes do not automatically converge 
to a predictable, well-specified distribution of outcomes” (Hirsch and Gil-
lespie 2001: 71). Minor factors at the outset determine the trajectory of a 
developing path and cause major effects. 
- Evolutionary path dependence focuses on analogies to biology. The idea of 
biological evolution is transferred to social processes. “Natural variation in 
the population combined with competition for limited resources leads to 
natural selection: Some organisms will be more ‘fit’ than others – better 
equipped to survive and thus to reproduce” (Hathaway 2001: 114). Institu-
tions and other social equilibria exist because they have survived the contest 
of social life. 
- Sequencing path dependence accentuates the idea of sequencing and timing. 
On the basis of the works of Arrow (1963) and Riker (1982) about voting 
processes with three or more alternatives it is argued that the sequence of 
considering alternatives can influence the outcome. “As Arrow recognized, 
if a social choice system is intransitive, outcomes depend on the procedural 
structure within which they are determined. The power to set the agenda can 
thus become, in a very real sense, the power to determine the result” 
(Hathaway 2001: 118). The agenda-setter can manipulate the vote by dictat-
ing the order for paired comparisons of the alternatives. Similar arguments 
are discussed in the literature on game theory. Particularly in coordination 
games, the order of the moves is relevant for the outcome. In both cases, the 
                                                             
5 For an alternative demarcation see Howlett and Rayner (2006). They differentiate between 
stochastic, narrative, path dependency and process-sequencing models of institutional change. 
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sequence of the moves determines the development of the path and the out-
come. The process is characterized by irreversibility. 
 
However, not all concepts of path dependency are compatible with rational 
choice narrativism. This is the case especially with respect to evolutionary path 
dependency which is based upon the idea of functionalism due to collective 
action problems (Olson 1965; Føllesdal et al. 1988: 165-181). 
The two other concepts of path dependence are compatible with rational 
choice narrativism as both concepts stress the idea of sequencing and timing. 
One characteristic of path dependency is that the “costs of switching from one 
alternative to another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over 
time” (Pierson 2004; 19). Another characteristic is that issues of timing and 
sequencing have an effect on the causal chain. They differ, though, with regard 
to the question of whether path dependent processes are only inflexible or 
rather irreversible. In the following it is suggested to use the term path depend-
ency only if the trajectory of a path is irreversible. In consequence, the devel-
opment of an institution can be characterized by the term path dependency if 
the development has been caused by its institutional setting and not by the 
environment of the institution. This means that the antecedent conditions at the 
onset of the process (the original institutional setting) are responsible for the 
way the institution evolves. The developing path of the institution can be an 
intended or non-intended result of the rational behavior of the actors. 
Due to that definition not all historical processes are path dependent.  
That past events and choices can influence and in some cases determine the 
outcomes of current political, economic, and social processes is indisputable, 
but the extent to which history matters and the mechanisms through which it 
operates in particular contexts are more difficult to unpack (Page 2005: 1). 
It is important to note that path dependence is only a term to characterize a 
specific feature of institutional development. It is not a theory to explain why 
institutions change – or do not change. Arthur discusses four factors generating 
path dependency in the field of technology (Arthur 1994: 112): large set-up 
costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations. In the 
following, it will be argued that these features are the basic variables of an 
explanation of institutional change. They can be used for a rational choice 
narrativism-based analysis of the development of international institutions 
(Pierson 2004: 24-53): 
- Large set-up costs are an incentive for large production runs, because “fixed 
costs can be spread over more output, which will lead to lower unit costs” 
(Pierson 2004: 24). In the context of analyzing international institutions, the 
start-up costs of organizations or regimes can be interpreted as a strong in-
centive to preserve once-arranged institutions. There is also a parallel psy-
chological effect enforcing this mechanism. A well known anomaly of clas-
sical models of rational choice is the sunk cost effect. From a 
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microeconomic perspective, rational actors should not consider invested 
money (sunk costs) when making rational decisions. As behavioral econom-
ics shows, though, actors evidently take into account the sunk costs and 
cling to expensive decisions even if they know that these decisions were 
wrong. This can be explained by attributing loss aversion to the rational ac-
tor (Arkes and Ayton 1999; Johnstone 2002). In consequence, rational ac-
tors have a tendency to stick to once-arranged institutions even if they work 
ineffectively. 
- A second factor promoting path dependency is the existence of learning 
effects. A higher level of knowledge about the procedures and the process 
coordination in international institutions reduces the transaction costs of the 
institutional members. There could also be a socialization effect in the sense 
that actors learn to value cooperation or defection and thus stabilize equilib-
ria (Vogt 2000). 
- Thirdly, the smoother an organization works, the lower are the losses by 
friction costs. Such coordination effects enhance the benefits of individual 
activity by reducing institutional restrictions and transaction costs. Further-
more, the members of well-functioning institutions are motivated to inten-
sify their activities in one field and to extend their activities to regulate 
neighboring policy fields.  
- Connected to this issue is the fourth factor: Expectations about the future 
development of an institution can increase the members’ cooperativeness. 
The argument is well known from game theoretic studies. It is the shadow of 
the future motivating people or states to trust each other and to cooperate 
(Axelrod and Keohane 1986). 
- Finally, another mechanism can be added to the factors proposed by Arthur. 
International organizations have an agenda. In rational choice theories on 
bureaucracy one finds the argument that bureaucrats try to maximize the 
budget of an institution by expanding the range of commitments (Fiorina 
and Noll 1978; Miller 2000; Niskanen 2007, 1996). Consequently, such be-
havior leads to inefficiencies and a waste of public funds. Applying this ar-
gument to the analysis of international institutions, the self-interests of the 
institution have to be taken into consideration. Institutions, once arranged, 
are characterized by inertia and, thus, resist efforts for dissolving (Keohane 
1984: 102). The reason in favor can be found in the officials’ interest in ma-
ximizing power, income and so on. Therefore, the individual interests of the 
staff can be added to the institutional setting, due to the interests aggregate 
in an institutional agenda. 
These motivating factors are necessary to extend the concept of path de-
pendency to a theory of chance or stability. These factors offer the variables 
that are relevant for the analysis of institutional change. The following chapter 
will discuss whether or not the phases of the international development of IPRs 
can be explained in reference to the concept of path dependency. 
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4. Path Dependency and Change in the International 
Development of IPRs 
The protection of IPRs is an old issue in international economic policy.6 How-
ever, the analysis of the developing path of the international regulation of IPRs 
seems rather under-studied. There is a thorough work of Christopher May with 
a strong historical focus on the development of the WIPO (May 2006). Some 
periods of the process are analyzed by Helfer (2004), Woolcock (2005) and 
Sell (2006, Sell and May 2001). Apart from these works, though, there are only 
very few studies looking for a causal analysis of the whole process based on a 
strong theoretical framework.  
First Period: From BIRPI to WIPO 
In the beginning the protection of IPRs was not an international but rather a 
national political issue. However, due to the growing economic interdepend-
ence and the progression of industrialization the protection of IPRs became an 
issue of international politics.  
In the twenty-five years between 1850 and 1875 an international controversy 
developed between those seeking to defend the protection of innovation and 
invention through the patent system, and those who contrasted this protection 
with the needs and demands of an international system of free trade (May 
2006: 15). 
In the 1860s and 1870s, the national governments and policy makers of the 
nowadays called industrialized countries became aware of the problematic 
aspects of IPRs. After intensive lobbying by German and Austrian patent attor-
neys, a convent on intellectual property was organized in Vienna in 1873. Five 
years later the idea was seized on and extended by two conferences in Paris 
(1878 and 1880). The process culminated in a final conference in 1883. The 
ratified Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property “covered 
patents, trademarks, and industrial designs. Member countries also constituted 
an International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, and it is in this 
organization that the WIPO finds it origins” (May 2006: 17). In the same year, 
a Congress of the International Literary Association in Bern decided to follow 
the Paris Convention with respect to literary and artistic goods. Three years 
later a treaty on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was adopted.7 It 
was also agreed to establish a permanent bureau called the Berner Bureau.  
                                                             
6  For a short overview over the history of IPRs see Botoy (2004) and May (2007). 
7  Because of national copyrights that were not compatible with the international treaty the US 
was not part of this convention. In 1891 they found a compromise in the Chace Act. The 
US did not join the international treaty until 1986, though. 
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The Berner Bureau was supervised by the Swiss government, which con-
trolled the funding of the Bureau. The Paris and the Bern Regimes included a 
convention, a Union of member states, and two administrative Bureaus. In 
1893, both bureaus were merged in one institution (BIRPI), the predecessor of 
the WIPO.8  
The founding phase of the international protection of IPRs was strongly in-
fluenced by the interests of transnational actors. Their position papers and the 
results of their meetings constituted the basis of the ensuing official treaties. 
The thus-established institution was stable and survived two World Wars and 
the world economic crisis (Menescal 2005). In 1960, the BIRPI moved from 
Bern to Geneva where the WIPO nowadays is still located. 
Development of the International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
 
The increasing institutionalization of the protection of IPRs was brought 
about by the process of economic interdependence. Zürn points to this central, 
causal mechanism when he argues that the dynamics of international politics, 
especially in the field of international economy, applies pressure on the existing 
international institutions (Zürn et al. 2007; Zürn 2004). 
The time after World War II was characterized by two opposing trends: On 
the one hand, the international system was characterized by the effects of de-
colonization. Accordingly, a number of developing countries emerged on the 
world stage. Nation-building and the enforced development of nation states 
were the outcomes.  
                                                             
8  “The underlying principles of both these initial multilateral intellectual property agreements 
were non-discrimination, national treatment and right of priority, offering protection to the 
first to invent or create, rather than the first to file or reproduce” (May 2006: 18). Conse-
quently, states were impelled not to make any difference between natives and foreigners 
with respect to the protection of their legitimate interests. There were no regulations focus-
ing on the substance a patent had to cover and no enforcement procedures. 
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On the other hand, the Western industrial countries underwent a process of 
denationalization. This process was characterized by increasing international 
trade and economic growth of the welfare states with an expansion of transna-
tional relations. John Ruggie coined the term ‘embedded liberalism’ for this 
period (Ruggie 1995). David Harvey stated that this time was shaped by the 
understanding that capitalism and communism “in their raw forms had failed” 
and thus he reasoned: “The only way ahead was to construct the right blend of 
state, market, and democratic institution to guarantee peace, inclusion, well-
being, and stability” (Harvey 2005: 10).  
With regard to of these two developments, there was a heightened need for 
regulating behind-the-border-issues with respect to both international and 
transnational activities (Helleiner 2006; Lang 2006). One may well argue that 
the ensuing international agreements ratified in the 1960s and 1970s reached a 
new quality (Zürn et al. 2007). Put in economic terms, the win expectations of 
the industrialized countries, their interests to lower transaction costs and the 
need to control negative externalities caused by a deficient protection system 
were the main causes which generated their will to enhance the protection level 
of IPRs (Miller 2000). 
Embedded Liberalism and a Trend Towards Supranationalism 
 
 
The development of the BIRPI is part of this trend in international relations. 
After World War II a growing number of states signed the conventions pertain-
ing to IPRs. Due to the weak patent protection in the new member states, na-
tional and international law collisions soared. The need for improving protec-
tion by enforcing the international agreements was growing. With the 
Stockholm Conference in 1967 an independent international institution was 
devised and finally established in Geneva three years later – the WIPO. Fol-
lowing, in 1974, the WIPO became a specialized agency of the United Nations.  
 189
The question to be asked at this point is whether this process from BIRPI to 
WIPO can be explained in terms of path dependency. At first sight, the dura-
tion and stability of the BIRPI is surprising and could be interpreted as a sign 
of path dependency. But the above-discussed factors generating path depend-
ence do not apply to BIRPI: 
One could argue that set-up costs served as an incentive for preserving 
BIRPI. After the founding the organization had grown steadily and had – in 
contrast to most other international institutions – its own income. During the 
first decades in the twentieth century the international protection of IPRs were 
strengthened continuously (Menescal 2005: 775). These modifications  
were often responses to new technologies in various economic sectors where 
IPRs were becoming more important, but also represented successful lobbying 
by a number of private sector groups that were eager to ensure that IPRs were 
both protected and extended (May 2006: 23). 
The growing economic interdependence and the technical development were 
the driving forces for the institutional development and motivated rational 
actors to coordinate their behavior and improve the protection level.  
But this development was not path dependent: At the same time as BIRPI 
was extended, the UN Economic and Social Council on the one side and the 
International Labor Organization [ILO] and the United Nations Education 
Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] on the other side proposed to 
involve other existing institutions except BIRPI in the protection of IPRs. They 
sought to integrate the regulation of IPRs into their own institutional frame-
work. The ILO and the UNESCO established an alternative copyright conven-
tion under the leadership of the UN which operated as an alternate diplomatic 
forum for international negotiations concerning IPRs. 
At this time, in the early 1960s, the BIRPI’s staff was well aware that other in-
ternational organizations, not least of all the UN Economic and Social Coun-
cil, were exploring the possibility of developing a more formal role in the in-
ternational governance of IPRs (May 2006: 23). 
At a meeting of BIRPI in 1962, a group of experts was asked to develop an 
agenda to stabilize BIRPI and to eliminate the control over BIRPI’s financial 
resources which – at that time – was exercised by the Swiss government.9 As 
mentioned above, the Stockholm Conference established the WIPO five years 
later. WIPO then became a specialized agency of the UN in 1974. To sum up, 
this development can be explained by three causes: 
1) Alternative institutions trying to protect IPRs (ILO, UNESCO) exercised 
exogenous pressure on the supporters of BIRPI to fulfill its responsibilities 
more satisfactorily. 
                                                             
9  BIRPI was still under financial control of the Swiss government. In 1963 the first non-
Swiss became Director of BIRPI, Georg H. C. Bodenhausen. 
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2) Due to the increasing economic interdependence, there was endogenous 
pressure on BIRPI to improve its performance. 
3) Furthermore, individual interests of the members of staff of BIRPI (of WI-
PO since 1968 respectively) were the driving forces for an institutional en-
hancement of their institution. Particularly Georg Bodenhausen, the first non 
Swiss Director, was a strong advocate of upgrading the status of WIPO and 
extending its spheres of influence – not least, we may assume, because he 
was also interested in the privileges that come with the diplomatic status 
granted to a specialized agency of the UN. 
All factors combined are relevant for the development of BIRPI to WIPO in 
the 1960s. Due to the importance of exogenous factors in this process, the 
concept of path dependency cannot be applied in this case. 
Second Period: Stagnation in WIPO and The Uruguay-Round 
As mentioned above the WIPO was founded in 1968 as a consequence of the 
economic interests of the industrialized countries. However, the institutional 
enhancement of WIPO as an UN agency obligates WIPO to commit itself to 
the development goals according to which sustainable economic development 
of the developing countries was to be accorded more importance than before. 
As this was not in accordance with the interests of the industrialized countries, 
they became increasingly dissatisfied with WIPO’s performance. At the same 
time, – quite understandingly – the growing number of developing states –
constituting the majority within WIPO since 1974 – became strong supporters 
of the organization.  
Decolonization as a Cause of Institutional Change 
Number of Contractual States of the two oldest contracts controlled by the 
WIPO 
 
Own illustration based on dates of <http://www.wipo.org>. 
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In 1964, thirty-nine countries voted in favor of enhancing BIRPI’s status by 
founding the WIPO as an independent international organization, nine of which 
were developing countries. In the following ten years, the number of member 
states doubled with most of the new members being developing countries. By 
1970, about eighty states had ratified the two oldest contracts controlled by the 
WIPO (Paris Convention and Berne Convention). Consequently, it became 
increasingly difficult and finally impossible for the industrialized states to 
mobilize majority support for stepping up the level of protection of IPRs.  
Again it has to be asked, if this development can be explained in terms of 
path dependency. Due to the recognition of the WIPO as a specialized UN 
agency, the normative pressure to promote the protection of IPRs for economic 
reasons in accordance with the developing goals of the UN increased. This 
pressure can be interpreted as institutional costs which influenced the calcula-
tion process so that actors felt the need to sustain their support for the institu-
tion even if the institution did no longer meet their economic expectations. 
These effects of institutions are well known in economic literature. 
Furthermore, sequencing played a major role. In this described context, it 
was only possible to raise the level of protection of IPRs prior to WIPO becom-
ing a specialized agency of the United Nations. Afterwards, this was no longer 
possible due to the attached commitment to sustainable economic development 
of the developing countries.  
Learning effects also played a major role since the developing countries be-
came aware of the “dark side” of IPRs (Menescal 2005). They increasingly 
promoted the idea that the interests of producers and consumers of intellectual 
property had to be balanced, and this was to be reflected by IPRs.  
Summing up the above arguments, the development of the WIPO from 
1967-1994 can be explained in terms of path dependency: Since 1967, the 
WIPO has been moving on a clear trajectory towards a balanced normative 
arrangement as to the international protection of IPRs. The institutional setting 
and the majority of the developing and least-developed countries in the WIPO 
are the main factors explaining the evolution of the institution. The normative 
commitment to the developing goals of the UN had not been intended by the 
industrialized countries and came into effect as a result of the process. 
However, the achieved protection level at that time obviously did not satisfy 
the needs of the industrialized countries as these countries were contemplating 
alternatives (Beier 1989). Therefore, the negotiations to enhance the protection 
level of IPRs were taken away from WIPO and integrated into the negotiations 
of the Uruguay Round to establish the World Trade Organization [WTO] 
(Srinivasan 1998; Tandon 2004; Woolcock 2005). The Uruguay Round was an 
opportunity to entrust an existing alternative international organization with the 
regulation of IPRs. Hence, no founding costs complicated the strategic forum 
shifting from WIPO to WTO/TRIPs, by which the industrialized countries 
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(especially the United States and EC) expected three institutional advantages 
(Helfer 2004: 21, 22):  
1) The US and EC have the largest domestic markets and, thus, the bargaining 
power to shape trade negotiations within WTO and to “force disclosure of 
weaker states’ preferences, block the advancement of proposals those states 
favored, and advance their own initiatives” (Helfer 2004: 21). The industri-
alized countries used the Uruguay Round to end the deadlock in the WIPO 
negotiations and enhance the protection level of IPRs (Primo Braga 1996). 
2) Another advantage of the forum-shifting is that the US and EC can link 
negotiations in different market sectors. In consequence, packet deals (om-
nibus agreements) become possible whenever states with inferior standards 
in IPRs agree upon higher protection levels in order to gain access to the ag-
ricultural or textile markets of the US and the EC. 
3) The WTO offers an efficient dispute settlement system that gives the US 
and the EC the opportunity to achieve binding decisions in the field of IPRs. 
“The establishment in 1995 of the robust dispute settlement mechanism at 
the new WTO gave the developed countries a weapon for enforcing the re-
gulation they wanted, that they had never before” (May 2006: 34-35). 
Accordingly, the forum-shifting was driven by the economic interests of the 
highly industrialized countries (Shaffer 2004: 2005). They expected higher 
gains by negotiating about a higher protection level of IPRs in the GATT/WTO 
instead of the WIPO. Since 1995 the protection of IPRs is an objective of 
TRIPs which represents one of the three main pillars of the World Trade Or-
ganization with the others being GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] and GATS [General Agreement on Trade in Services] (Senti 2000: 
1994). This institutional change marks a turning point in the international regu-
lation of IPRs through the WIPO. The WTO did not supplant WIPO as a rele-
vant institution for the protection of IPRs but changed its character. “TRIPs 
itself implicitly acknowledges the continuing importance of WIPO as a forum 
for negotiating treaties” (Helfer 2004: 25). An agreement between WIPO and 
WTO regulates the division of labour between the institutions. The WIPO is 
still protecting several treaties on IPRs but also took over a new function as it 
assists developing and least-developed countries to use intellectual property to 
promote social and economic development (Niemann 2008).  
Third Period: Institutional Stagnation in WTO And TRIPs-Plus 
Treaties 
With the entry of IPRs in the institutional framework of the WTO the obliga-
tion of IPRs was strengthened. TRIPs is guaranteeing a minimum standard for 
all member states and also has institutional instruments to enforce the binding 
power of these rules. Especially the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO is 
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a powerful instrument of the industrialized countries to force other countries to 
guarantee the standards of TRIPs (Leitner and Lester 2010). 
At first glance, it seems that TRIPs/WTO is a result of the interests of the 
industrialized countries that meets all expectations. However, this institutional 
change also had non-intended results: 
1) The strong economic effects of TRIPs on developing and least-developed 
countries provoked strong civic resistance. Until 1995, none of the signifi-
cant NGOs was critical towards Intellectual Property Rights. With the inclu-
sion of IPRs in the WTO agreement, though, the international protection of 
IPRs intensified. The TRIPs-agreement is setting normative standards for 
the treatment of behind-the-border-issues that are binding for non-state-
actors within and between states.  
2) Due to the recognition of IPRs in the context of WTO, public awareness was 
increased. Consequently, the pressure on the powerful nations to practice 
what they preach with respect to the protection of intellectual property in-
creased.  
3) In the case of the terrorist attacks with Anthrax, the US government justified 
the violation of the intellectual property rights of Bayer with regards to the 
antidote to Anthrax by claiming the situation to be a state of national health 
emergency (which is provided for in the IPR rules). In the following, the US 
was put under enormous moral pressure. Countries with high mortality rates 
due to HIV referred to the same IPR rule to justify the production of gener-
ics. As a consequence, the industrialized countries agreed to make conces-
sions to developing countries for the production of generic drugs. 
The processes of trans- and supranationalism create a so far unparalleled 
civic political awareness with a high demand for transparent and fair decision 
making procedures within the international institutions (Smythe 2007). Such a 
phenomenon can be explained by the idea of negative externalities that is basal 
for rational choice theory. Negative externalities for private consumers created 
by institutional rules of the WTO generated the will to control these institu-
tional effects. 
At the moment, it is not sure if a further enhancement of the protection level 
is possible. Negotiations are under way, and it is not clear what the results will 
be (Woolcock 2005). One may fear that the process will end in deadlock as it is 
currently the case with respect to TRIPs. Furthermore, it can be observed that 
several bi- and multilateral TRIPs-Plus negotiations took place. At present time 
(2010), the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is negotiated to 
improve the enforcement of the existing IPRs. The negotiation process take 
place outside the existing international institutions governing IPRs. History 
seems to iterate. 
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Supra- and Transnationalisation Leads to Increased Political Awareness of the 
Society 
 
5. Conclusion 
Analyzing historical processes is not exclusively the domain of historians. The 
explananda of political scientists can also be historical. Hence, there seemed to 
be much reason for collaboration. However, the interdisciplinary dialogue 
between these disciplines is rare and even the field of academic education is 
separated. I have argued that in analyzing historical processes no fundamental 
methodological differences exist between the disciplines. Scientists of both 
disciplines agree to refer to the idea of human agency in analyzing historical 
processes. On the basis of rational choice narrativism the development of the 
international regulation of IPRs was analyzed. It was argued that there are two 
major factors influencing the development of the protection of intellectual 
property:  
- On the one hand, there is a strong interest of those in favour of protecting 
intellectual property to establish a strong institution serving this purpose. 
Thus, they promoted the substitution of BIRPI by WIPO.  
- On the other hand, there are the economic and social interests of the devel-
oping countries. They also found access to the international organizations. 
WIPO for example, as a specialized UN agency, is committed to the UN’s 
goals to support sustainable economic development in Third World coun-
tries – which in the aftermath of decolonization constituted the majority of 
the WIPO member states. This commitment was incompatible with protect-
ing the intellectual property produced by the industrialized countries.  
As a result the industrialized countries try to shift the forum to enforce the 
protection of IP. This interplay between the interests of the industrialized and 
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the developing countries leads to a typical movement than can be described as 
a pendulum motion. 
The process starts with an institutional enhancement from BIRPI to WIPO. 
Then the pendulum swings back: A blockade by the developing countries is the 
result. But the pendulum swings back: The industrialized countries shift the 
forum from WIPO to GATT/WTO to enhance the protection level. And the 
pendulum swings back again: We find a blockade by the developing countries 
in the WTO. At the moment we can observe negotiations outside the existing 
institutions to enhance the protection level of IPRs. 
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